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Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
In the second week of July 1971, Henry Kissinger visitedBeijing in the greatest secrecy. So little did Kissinger andhis group know of contemporary China that they as-
sumed, quite wrongly, that the anti-American slogans
glimpsed as they sped through Beijing had been put up for
the express benefit of their visit. This visit, which presaged
a tectonic shift in the politics of Asia and the Pacific, was
revealed to the world on 15 July. The Japanese Ambassador
in Washington was informed barely one hour before the
public announcement, and Prime Minister Sato in Tokyo
had only minutes of notice.
The following February Nixon signed the Shanghai Com-
muniqué, and within three months Sato was gone and the
campaign for presidency of the Liberal Democrat Party was
underway. In this election the successful anti-Sato forces
were committed to the immediate normalisation of relations
with China.
In spite of a lack of formal ties, Japan’s trade with China had
actually grown with extraordinary speed in the years preced-
ing this breakthrough – rising from 1.6 percent of China’s
global trade in 1960 to nearly 20 percent by 1970. But this
was largely trade with small “friendly firms” and “dummy”
corporations. Most large corporations had stuck with the
Sato line, through which they enjoyed the benefits of close
relations with Taiwan that in many cases went back to the
early part of the century.((1)
As normalisation approached in the summer of 1972, the
appetite for knowledge about China in those Japanese busi-
ness circles was enormous. As a visiting “China specialist”
working in Japan that summer on the economic history of
pre-war Manchuria, I was called upon to provide some talks.
At the end of one of these sessions, a gentleman sitting im-
mediately to my right leaned across and said: “You might be
interested to know
that I was a signa-
tory to the surren-
der of the Kwan-
tung Army in
1945.” He added
that if I wanted to
understand the
Manchurian politi-
cal legacy I must
study the writings
of Ishiwara Kenji.
Apart from the ad-
vice on Ishiwara, I
took away from this
and subsequent ex-
periences two basic
impressions: the
first was that during
those years an ex-
traordinarily high percentage of senior Japanese had back-
ground in Manchuria. In some cases their background was
as officials, in others as businessmen, professional experts of
all kinds, military personnel, or as relatives of those who had
such connections. These Manchurian personal histories
were not prominently discussed, certainly not with foreign-
ers, but nonetheless, and notwithstanding the often tragic
outcomes, Manchurian days had been for many the most
idealistic, fulfilling, and extraordinary times of their lives.
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1. Yoshihide Soeya, Japan’s Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978, Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1998, Chapter 6; Margaret Macmillan, When Nixon met Mao, London,
John Murray, 2006.
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My second impression was that Japanese businessmen con-
sidered Japan’s occupation of Manchuria and China proper
to have done immense economic damage (indeed, they
found it difficult to credit Anglo-American estimates of
China’s economic performance in the 1950s and 1960s),((2)
and they therefore felt that Japan owed China a huge but
unquantified economic debt. The Chinese leadership played
cleverly on this, and it was undoubtedly a factor in the
Japanese willingness to sign contracts during the “China
boom” of 1972-1978. This early post-war flowering in Sino-
Japanese relations, therefore, reflected attitudes towards
China based on first-hand experience, frequently in
Manchuria. But as Shinichi Yamamuro points out in the
major study reviewed here, “The number of people who
have no knowledge of Manzhouguo increases with each
passing day.” For the younger generation, both in Japan and
in a long-unified People’s Republic of China, Manchuria is
both an historical legacy and an experience easily trans-
muted into myths – myths that today still give rise to disturb-
ing political emotions and have serious consequences for
Sino-Japanese relations. 
These are some of the broader issues explored in Shin’ichi
Yamamuro’s Manchuria under Japanese Domination, trans-
lated from his Kimera: Manshukoku no Shozo (Chimera: A
portrait of Manchuria). First published in 1993, his book
now comes with additional material in the form of after-
thoughts and an interview with the author. 
Much work has been done by Japanese historians on the his-
tory of Manchuria, but Yamamuro’s book represents an impor-
tant individual attempt to probe the complicated political real-
ities of the state of Manzhouguo (Manchukuo), which lasted
from 1932 until 1945.((3) The work is based on a huge variety
of documentary and non-documentary resources, and benefits
from being written at time when factual investigation is being
enriched by a more discursive form of history. In making this
work available in English, Joshua Fogel has done the interna-
tional scholarly community a wonderful service. Translating re-
flective Japanese writing of this kind is exceedingly difficult,
and it is not surprising that the task has taken Fogel so many
years, but the end result has been brilliantly accomplished. 
The over-arching idea of Yamamuro’s work is summed up in
his concept of the “chimera” – a mythical beast with the
head of a lion and the tail of a serpent. Yamamuro uses this
metaphor of illusion tainted with horror to describe the 13-
year history of Manzhouguo as a construct once driven by
ideals and illusions that brought disaster to China and to
Japan itself, but which is now fading into a dreamlike form
in both countries.
This article discusses the background to the Manzhouguo
experience, points out the major themes of Yamamuro’s
work, and relates it to the longer running story of western
writing about Manchuria. This is a field that is still flourish-
ing and developing as new historical sources are explored
and as new experiences in the development of northeast
Asia unfold and throw retrospective light on the underlying
structural realities of the region.The  background to Manzhouguo
What, then, was the background of the Japanese military in-
tervention in the “Mukden incident” of 1931 and the subse-
quent formation of the state of Manzhouguo in 1932?
Manchuria is very much a case that requires distinguishing
structure and the longue durée from accidents and événe-
ments.((4) In particular, it is important to understand what
structures were critical to an understanding not only of
Manchuria, but also of Mongolia; although politically dis-
tinct, as Yamamuro shows, Mongolia was so integral to
Japanese thinking that the Manchurian question was fre-
quently referred to as the Man-Mo (Manchuria-Mongolia )
question. 
Manchuria is defined physically by mountain ranges, its cen-
tral plain, and vast river systems. These rivers mark natu-
ral/political boundaries and important transport arteries that
run through the interior. To the north and east, the Amur
and Ussuri perform both border and economic functions,
while the Sungari, the Nonni, and the Liao rivers are cru-
cial for internal transport.
Climatic factors are also important elements in Manchurian
history. The long winters and short growing season deter-
mine the nature and labour requirements in the plain and in
the valleys, where various forms of temperate agriculture are
possible. In contrast to “traditional” China south of the
Yangtze, this agriculture focuses mainly on forestry and the
cultivation of pulses, maize, and traditional cold climate
crops. Of great importance after the turn of the century was
2. It should be borne in mind that much published information in Japanese up to 1972 was
produced by left-wing sympathisers in publications such as Jinmin Chûgoku (People’s
China) and Shin Chûgoku nenkan (New China Yearbook). These publications contained
much useful information, but surrounded it in a rosy halo of Maoist ideology. 
3. Manzhouguo is the standard Chinese romanisation of the name of the state commonly
referred to as Manchukuo, which lasted from 1932 to 1945. Mansh koku is the Japan-
ese form of this name, while “Manchuria” refers to the original three north-eastern
provinces now commonly known in China as dongbei. 
4. Michele Vovelle, “L’histoire et la longue durée,” in Jacques Le Goff (ed.), La Nouvelle 
Histoire, Paris, CEPL, 1978, pp. 77-108. 
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the soya bean, which grew with particular abundance in the
friable soil covering the hills north of Mukden and in the wa-
tery meadows of the Liao and Sungari rivers.((5) Climate was
also important for transport and hence for the networks of in-
ternal and external trade. In summer, the unfrozen rivers can
be used to float logs and expedite the movement of agricul-
tural produce from the hinterland, but heavy rains during
that season once made movement on the muddy, unmetalled
roads impossible. In winter, by contrast, the frozen roads
tracks were usable, but the frozen rivers prevented shipping
movement. Overall, the vast region of Manchuria-Mongolia
with its mountains, forests, and trackless northern wilder-
nesses was for centuries a terrain where population was
sparse or nonexistent and where “national” boundaries were
vague and largely unenforceable by conventional means.
The social and political systems found in the region adapted
to these conditions. Nomadic Mongolians, for example,
recognised collective grazing but not individual forms of land
ownership, while the Manchurians, enjoying the space of
their traditional homeland and organised in localised Banners
“north of the wall,” formed a political buffer that separated
the Han Chinese from the wilder barbarians further to the
north. 
As a “frontier” region colonised in different ways by differ-
ent nationalities and ethnic groups, Manchuria was home to
a variety of different racial types (Mongols, Manchurians,
Chinese, Koreans, Russians, etc.). At many points of con-
tact, these groups had a tendency to mix both by marriage
and cultural adoption, and it has been argued that this led
them to play a key role in the fluctuating frontiers of settle-
ment and migration.((6)
These relatively stable, long-term structures began to show
signs of serious disturbance from the middle of the nine-
teenth century. A fundamental factor here was steam tech-
nology. Not only did this open Manchuria to trans-Pacific in-
fluences of trade and modern imperialism, but through com-
peting railway systems drew Russians, Japanese, Chinese,
and some western nations into conflict in the Manchurian
melting pot. The pioneering Russian Chinese Eastern Rail-
way, for example, cut through Northern Manchuria, began
to revolutionise the Manchurian economy, and led to the
creation of Harbin – a modern Russian-style city. This rail-
way, combined with trading advantages arising from strong
positions on the Amur and Ussuri rivers, gave the Russians
a dominant role in North Manchuria, the far-reaching polit-
ical potential of which was demonstrated when Russians
briefly occupied Manchuria militarily following the Boxer
Rebellion of 1900. 
This “railway imperialism” impressed the Japanese, who es-
tablished the South Manchurian Railway in 1906, immedi-
ately following the Russo-Japanese War. Following the Russ-
ian model, this enterprise combined railway construction with
wider forms of economic development and the acquisition of
a variety of extra-territorial and commercial rights.((7) Western
activity was also present in the scramble for railway “rights,”
and the Americans, to whom the Manchurian “frontier” rep-
resented a possible Pacific extension of their now closed inter-
nal frontier, sought to maintain a Manchurian Open Door.((8)
By the end of the century, foreign penetration of Manchuria
was also reflected in the presence of seven Treaty Ports and
the Kwantung Leased Territory, which was leased first to the
Russians and then taken over by Japan. Among the Treaty
Ports, Newchwang (Yingkou), was opened to foreign trade
and run by the British from 1858. Situated at the mouth of
the Liao and ice-free for eight months of the year, the port
was used by up to 10,000 small to medium-sized junks that set
the foundation for a huge international trade in the soya bean
business. On the basis of this economic expansion, Newch-
wang’s status flowered with the emergence of polite society,
winter tea dances, and regular reports of its social and busi-
ness activities in the Shanghai New China Herald.((9)
Railway and commercial development was accompanied by
western missionary activity. The first Catholic Bishop of
Manchuria was appointed as early as 1838, and in the 1880s a
visiting Protestant in Newchwang attended a Christmas Mid-
night Mass already so adapted to local custom that the elevation
of the Host was accompanied by wild acclamation and a
tremendous display of fireworks. Western missionary penetra-
tion was hated by the Russians, who supported the expansion
of the Orthodox Church in areas under their control. So unpop-
ular was missionary activity with extremist anti-foreign groups
that the two main targets of the Boxer rebels in Manchuria were
reported to have been the railways and the missionaries.((10)
5. China Imperial Maritime Customs, Special Series No. 31, The Soya Bean of Manchuria,
Shanghai, 1911.
6. Owen Lattimore, Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict, New York, Macmillan, 1932, especially
Chapter 2.
7. The role of the CER is indicated by the company statutes reprinted in Percy Horace Kent,
Railway Enterprise in China, Edward Arnold, London, 1907, Appendix A IV. The role of the
CER model and the SMR is discussed in illuminating detail in a recent study, Yoshihisa
Tak Matsukata, The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904-1932, Harvard University
Asia Center, 2001, Chapters 2 and 3. 
8. Michael H. Hunt, Frontier Defense and the Open Door: Manchuria in Chinese-American
Relations, 1895-1911, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1973.
9. Bank of Chosen, Economic History of Manchuria, Seoul, 1921, Chapter 1.
10. Adrien Launay, Monseigneur Verrolles et la Mission de Manchourie, Paris, 1895, and
“History of Christian Mission,” Contemporary Manchuria, Vol. IV No.1, January 1940, pp.
29-55. The description of the Midnight Mass is in H.E.M. James, The Long White Moun-
tain or a Journey in Manchuria, London, Longmans, 1888, p. 394. 
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By the 1920s the Manchurian economy was enjoying a
boom based on the export of raw materials and the increas-
ing use of modern transport technologies.((11) But while
Russo-Japanese rivalry had been temporarily stabilised in
favour of Japan, the new force of Chinese nationalism and
its search for political form was rising. This political mod-
ernisation was manifest not only in measures to reassert tar-
iff and economic authority but also in an expansionist quest
to “reclaim” extra-territorial concessions and redefine
China’s geographical borders, especially in the north and
northeast. The rise of Zhang Tsolin, and then of Zhang
Xueliang, who allied with the Guomindang (Kuomintang)
in 1928, made realisation of these political aspirations seem
feasible. The instability of agriculture in North China also
encouraged unprecedented northward flows of Chinese mi-
grants, many seeking permanent rather than temporary em-
ployment and residence, and this gave demographic sub-
stance to China’s ambitions for Manchuria.((12)The  experi ence  of  Manzhouguo
This, then, is the background against which Yamamuro’s ex-
plorations of the phenomenon of Manzhouguo after 1932
have to be considered. His study opens by examining the
thinking that conditioned Japan’s commitment to the
Manchurian-Mongolian adventure. He then explores the
early stages by which Japan moved from the immediate post-
Mukden (i.e. post-September 1931) situation to the decision
to establish Manzhouguo as an “independent” political na-
tion. Finally, he analyses the way in which the early ideals
and hopes for Manzhouguo were progressively and cynically
betrayed so that the new state became an integral part of the
Japanese war machine responsible for horrifying abuses of
human rights, coercive exploitation, and ultimate disaster
and physical humiliation for Japan and thousands of Japan-
ese in Manchuria.
The starting point for strategic thinking by Ishiwara and the
Kwantung Army was reflection on the significance of the
First World War. This seemed to the Army leadership to il-
lustrate that the world was entering an era of “protracted”
all-out war, based on the mass production and increasing
technological sophistication of armaments. Japan needed to
ensure that it had both the raw materials for the huge indus-
trial outputs required and the ability to develop the neces-
sary technologies, including revolutionary developments in
metallurgy, aircraft construction, vehicles, and wireless. Dur-
ing the war the western powers had leapt ahead of Japan,
and in the 1920s made new advances, especially in electri-
cal and chemical technologies, with which Japan failed to
keep pace. Indeed, in the immediate post-war period, while
the western war theatre employed modern tanks, planes, and
submarines, the Japanese Army’s basic equipment remained
infantry rifles of the type used in the Russo-Japanese War
of 1905 (Yamamuro p.19).
It was also foreseen that a “protracted” war would within a
few decades turn into a “final” war of annihilation in which
the protagonists would be the United States versus an East
Asia led by a Japan that could draw on the full hinterland of
Northeast Asia for resources. Japanese historians provided
support for this vision through research indicating that
Manchuria and Korea were historically relatively undefined
“regions” that could now be logically attached to Japan as a
joint entity referred to as Mansen (i.e. Manchuria-
Korea).((13) Korea, already a colony of Japan, played an im-
portant part in military thinking, given its apparent vulnera-
bility to Russian pressure, and Korean migration into
Manchuria also raised questions about the viability of Japan-
ese control in Korea and ultimate responsibility for the Ko-
rean population of Manchuria
This military resource argument was reinforced in the early
1930s by the view that the domestic economic crisis in
Japan required “outlets” for Japan’s surplus population, as
well as control of sources of food supply in addition to those
already being developed in Korea and Taiwan. “Our na-
tional state of affairs,” wrote Ishiwara, “has reached an im-
passe. The critical problems of populations and foodstuffs
seem all without solution. The only avenue that public opin-
ion recognizes is boldly to open up Manchuria …” (Yama-
muro, p.17). A further dimension that Yamamuro does not
explore is the importance of Manchuria as a market in which
Japanese goods could be given a measure of protection
against competition from more advanced industrial nations.
Manchuria and Korea had already performed this function
for Japan’s light and textile industries before 1914, but
Japan’s heavy industries badly needed a similarly advanta-
11. Table 11.1 in Christopher Howe, “Japan’s economic experience in China before the es-
tablishment of the Peoples Republic of China: A retrospective balance sheet,” Ronald
Dore and Radha Sinha, Japan and World Depression, Then and Now: Essays in Memory
of E.F. Penrose, London, Macmillan, 1987. 
12. There were famines in Shantung in 1919,1920, 1926,1927, and 1928. By the late
1920s, over one million Chinese a year were migrating northward. See, “Chinese migra-
tions to Manchuria,” Special Study No.3, Report of the Commission of Enquiry, Vol.2.
(The “Lytton Commission”), Geneva, 1932. This report with its appendices of expert
studies and maps, remains the best account of Manchuria on the eve of the Japanese
coup of 1932. 
13. Stefan Tanaka, Japan’s Orient: Rendering Pasts into History, Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1993, pp.246-7.
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geous market in the 1920s and 1930s.((14) The issues at stake
were not merely quantitative, but systemic; what reformers
called for were new systems for organising resources, not
simply enhanced resources as such. Manchuria offered a lab-
oratory from which the influences of finance capital and mo-
nopolies could be excluded and institutional arrangements
could be set up to “test in Manchuria, apply in Japan.”((15)
For intellectual theorists such as Tachibana Shiraki, these
experiments would be conducted in a society that was egali-
tarian, democratic, professional, and non-capitalist (Yama-
muro pp. 74-81).
A Japanese expansion into Manchuria and Mongolia
seemed to provide a comprehensive, strategically coherent
package that would answer the pressing military, political,
and economic concerns facing Japan at the turn of the
decade and constitute wise provision for the longer term.
One interesting point that Yamamuro emphasises here is
that the views of Ishiwara reflected not only his study of mil-
itary issues, but also his adherence to Nichiren Buddhism.
Nichiren (1222-1282) had declared that the ultimate unifi-
cation of the world under Buddhist principles would require
a “great, hitherto unseen battle that would arise in the
human realm” (p.32). The technological conditions for such
a cataclysmic war (especially the prospect of mass aerial
bombing of cities) seemed now to be coming into place. 
Any occupation of Manchuria and Mongolia by Japan
raised the ethnic issue. As we have seen, these regions were
home to a variety of racial types, and Ishiwara’s view was
that the inhabitants of Man-Mo were, in fact, closer racially
to the Japanese than to the Han Chinese, a view that spilled
into the controversies surrounding the Lytton Commission
enquiry of 1932. In the end, the Japanese abandoned the
extreme claim of Man-Mo-Japanese racial congruence, and
went instead for the argument that the multi-racial character
of Man-Mo was part of the case for Manzhouguo as a
unique and “independent” political entity that would em-
body the fundamental principle of racial equality.
Yamamuro explores the ways in which attempts were made
to give the concept of “independence” credibility while allow-
ing Japan to maintain political and economic control. He
shows first how “local” Manchurian claims to independence
were used to build up a case against the Guomindang and its
constitutional form, examines the role of Chinese theorists
such as Yu Chonghan, and then discusses the steps by which
Pu Yi was brought into the picture, first in the role of “Chief
Executive” and then, in 1934, as Emperor of Manchuria. 
To achieve imperial status, Pu Yi underwent an extraordi-
nary double ceremony, in the morning ascending the Tem-
ple of Heaven in a traditional imperial gown embroidered
with gold dragons, and then, in the afternoon, celebrating a
coronation in military uniform during which he promised
permanent cooperation with the Japanese Empire in “all
long-term plans for protecting the country and salutary tac-
tics for governing the state” (Yamamuro pp.155-56).((16)
The evolution of Manzhouguo was highly controversial at
many levels and in many spheres. Foreign Minister Shide-
hara, for example, had sought but failed to implement a solu-
tion consistent with the League of Nations and a more concil-
iatory approach to China.((17) In business circles in Manchuria,
the conflicting interests of small and large firms and of old and
new Zaibatsu were important, while to Japanese businesses
already highly competitive and well established as investors
and traders in Shanghai and the Yangtze Valley, the military
adventures in Manchuria proved disastrous.((18)
In intellectual circles, the most impressive and striking dissi-
dent discussed by Yamamuro was Yanaihara Tadao. Yanai-
36 N o  2 0 0 7 / 4
14. Christopher Howe, The Origins of Japanese Trade Supremacy: Development and Tech-
nology in Asia, 1540 to the Pacific War, Chicago University Press, 1996, Chapter 13.
15. Bai Gao, Economic Ideology and Japanese Industrial Policy: Developmentalism from
1931 to 1965, Cambridge University Press, 1997, especially Chapter 3, “The managed
economy.” 
16. This ceremony was vividly described by Edgar Snow, an eyewitness, in The Far Eastern
Front, Jarrold, London, 1934. It also made a memorable scene in Jeremy Thomas’s film
The Last Emperor. 
17. Ian Nish, Japan’s Struggle with Internationalism: Japan, China and the League of Na-
tions, 1931-1933, London, Kegan Paul, 1993.
18. The relations between business and Manchuria is one of the topics brilliantly explored
in Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and Culture of Wartime Imperialism,
Chapter 5, “Uneasy Partnership: Soldiers and Capitalists in the Colonial Economy,”
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1995.
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The propaganda poster proclaims: “Japan,
China and Manzhouguo cooperate in order to
achieve the ultimate peace under heaven.”
From right to left, the people on the poster hold
the Chinese, Japanese and Manchu flags.
hara held the Chair of Colonial Policy in Tokyo from 1923
to 1937, and his collected works run to 29 volumes. His
analysis of colonial Taiwan is so brilliant that it remains in
print to this day, and his work on Manchuria, although tem-
pered by the political circumstances in which he found him-
self, constituted a serious critique of Japanese policies.
Yanaihara saw (and foresaw) the significance of economic
links between Japan and Manchuria, but at the same time
he understood the illusions, fabrications, and hypocrisy sur-
rounding Manzhouguo. He argued that Japan’s long-term
policy should be to assist the rise and political consolidation
of Chinese nationalism rather than to destroy it.((19)
Yamamuro describes how, piece by piece, the idealistic vi-
sions of Manzhouguo were lost. Manchurian “indepen-
dence” gave way to political absorption by the Japanese em-
pire. Racial equality was lost as promised shares of appoint-
ments and opportunities for Manchurians were ceded to
Japanese appointees. And in place of a mutual prosperity
came starvation, naked beggars, forced labour, land confisca-
tion, and the horrors of human experimentation. By the
1940s, the nightmares of the chimera were being realised
(Yamamuro p.199ff).Manchurian legac ies
The legacies of the Manzhouguo experiment are numerous.
For historians, the first of these is the extraordinary volume
and variety of sources to work from. That these are far supe-
rior to those for “China proper” is due to the culture and in-
defatigable efforts of Japanese institutions and individuals. It
is these scholarly resources that have made possible the
work of Japanese historians and of western specialists such
as Ramon Myers, Mark Peattie, Peter Duus, Louise Young,
and others. The statistical legacy has been particularly im-
portant in enabling scholars to reconstruct Manchurian de-
velopment and demography in a way that will never be pos-
sible for other parts of China.
The historical legacy in post-war Japanese economic man-
agement and planning has been mentioned and is well re-
searched, while Louise Young’s study has shown us how
deeply the Manchurian question influenced Japan’s domes-
tic social and political development. The legacy in China is
much less well studied, but in the past few years this has
begun to change as Chinese concerns have risen concerning
the north-eastern provinces, which represented the core of
the Chinese development effort throughout the 1950s in
spite of the impact of war and Russian industrial theft in
Manchuria after 1945. Of the 156 Key Point Soviet projects
initiated in the First Five Year Plan (1953-57), 54 were in
Manchuria, and this boost was reinforced in the 1960s by
the development of Daqing, Shengli, and other north-east-
ern oilfields.
In the early stages of the reform, the rapid development of
coastal, export-oriented light industry left the old state-
owned industries of the northeast in relative decline. This
trend is now being actively reversed, however, and cities
such as Qingdao and Dalian are once again becoming the
central points for new high technology industrial and service
clusters based to a considerable extent on foreign and espe-
cially Japanese investment. The peaceful strategy for Japan-
ese trade and investment in China, an experiment in the
1920s ultimately wrecked by the Manzhouguo adventure, is
now working. This progress, moreover, is not simply the re-
sult of decentralised market relations, but also reflects con-
scious regional institution building at many levels and on
both sides of the Yellow Sea.((20)
One issue that remains puzzling to this reader of Yamamuro
and the western literature on Manchuria is the failure to pick
up on the controversies surrounding the view that Japan
needed Manchuria as an “outlet” for surplus population.
This view, shared by several western writers including W.R.
Crocker and George Bronson Rea, was challenged at the
37N o  2 0 0 7 / 4
19. A deeply thought and indispensable account of Yanaihara’s life and thought has been
provided by Susan C. Townsend in Yanaihara Tadao and Japanese Colonial Policy: Re-
deeming Empire, London, Curzon, 2000. 
20. Three representative studies are: Ning Yi and Dong Ning, Dongbei zazheng:Dongbei
wenti baogao (How to put the northeast right: Report of north-eastern problems), World
Press, Beijing, 2004; Central Party School, Dongbei dichu deng lao gongye jidi zhenxing
zhanliu (Strategies to revive the northeast and similar old industrial regions), Beijing,
Central Party School Publishing House, 2004; Shanghai Finance and Economics Re-
search Centre for Regional Economics, Dongbei lao gongye jidi fuxing yanjiu (Research
into the revival of the old industrial regions of the northeast), Beijing, Red Flag Publish-
ing House, 2004.
Pu Yi, Emperor 
of the Manzhouguo.
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time by the important demographer Uyeda Teijiro, and by
E.F. Penrose, who explored the issue of Japanese Malthu-
sianism in a remarkable book published in 1934. A further
exhaustive examination of the issues was provided by Irene
Taeuber in her vast work, The Population of Japan .((21)
The problem at the time was that the statistical techniques
and demographic models needed to measure and predict fer-
tility change and the long-term trajectory of the Japanese
population were in their infancy. Penrose, however, who
read Japanese fluently, was at the forefront of this work, in-
tegrating it with his own pioneering measurement of Japan’s
agricultural and industrial output, and with the latest think-
ing (by the Swedish economist Bertil Ohlin) on the theory
of comparative advantage in international trade. In essence,
Ohlin pointed out that the exchange of goods could substi-
tute for the “necessity” of factor, e.g. population movement.
Penrose and Uyueda both pointed out that correctly under-
stood, Japanese fertility was already declining in the 1920s,
and Penrose drew on his economic analysis to argue that
what Japan needed was a more liberal trading environment,
not more land, an argument that Tobata Seiichi (the most
revered of Japan’s twentieth century economists) revived in
the immediate post war period. War and the  problems of  r econci l iation
Yamamuro emphasises that for the survivors, “the wounds
of Manzhouguo continue to ache and will not heal or disap-
pear” (Yamamuro, p. 20). Clearly, too, these wounds do
not seem to die with the original sufferers, but live on in po-
litical consciousness. One asks, therefore, what possible de-
velopments may ease this problem. The parallel with West-
ern Europe is perhaps of some help in considering this
question.
The combatants on the western front in World War Two all
have their own places of memorial and ceremonies of re-
membrance, but the joint remembrance of the June 6th in-
vasion of Normandy has grown in significance in recent
years. The 50th and more recently the 60th anniversary
(2004) were particularly big occasions. 
On the weekend of 6 June 2004, more than 20 world and
government leaders gathered in the village of Arromanches
on the Normandy coast. A small fishing village with a his-
tory going back to Roman times, Arromanches became a
popular resort for Parisians with the arrival of the railway in
the nineteenth century. The destiny of this village was
changed forever when it was chosen by military planners to
be the geographical centre point of the D-Day invasion and
the site of the war’s only successful artificial harbour.
The world leaders who met at Arromanches included not
only the leaders of all the Allied and Commonwealth coun-
tries together with President Putin of Russia, but also Chan-
cellor Schroeder of Germany. The inclusion of a German
leader for the first time obviously reflected a very high-level
political decision. More important, however, was the fact
that the ceremony was also a product of grass roots reconcil-
iation, particularly involving the local population. Normandy
suffered thousand of casualties from Allied bombing during
the course of the campaign of 1944, not to mention the de-
struction of several of beautiful medieval cities. Few Nor-
mans escaped the impact of these tragedies, and without
willing local participation the event would not have worked.
Underlying this grass roots acceptance of reconciliation was
an important psychological reality. As people age, it seems
that not only does long-term memory sharpen, but the need
for reconciliation with enemies – especially among war com-
batants – seems to become more pressing. The minimum
age for veterans at the 60th anniversary would have been
about 80 years old, making this ceremony the last that many
could hope to attend. There is reason to think that similar
factors might be at work in Sino-Japanese relations, as evi-
denced by the experiences of individuals who have partici-
pated in the remarkable Japanese-British reconciliation
meetings in recent years. The roadblock to Sino-Japanese
reconciliation, therefore, may lie not with those who have
first-hand experience, but with those in the grip of simplis-
tic, sometimes mistaken histories. That is why the endeav-
ours of scholars such Yamamuro and those beginning to
work in the joint Sino-Japanese historical forums are so im-
portant. 
Interestingly, the Chinese observed what happened at Arro-
manches with close attention, sending a team from Central
Television to record the event and talk to the oldest veterans
they could find. In discussion, the young team agreed that a
reconciliation of the kind they had observed was not feasi-
ble in the Far East for the present, but they hoped nonethe-
less that ultimately it would become so. •
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21. E.F. Penrose, Population Theories and their Application, With Special Reference to Japan,
Food Research Institute, Stanford, 1934. Irene B. Taeuber, The Population of Japan, Prince-
ton University Press, 1958. The writings of Yueda are listed in Taeuber’s bibliography. 
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